Legal Term Dictionary

In Roman law. A name applied to the Roman law of wills,o in the time of Justinian, on account of Its' threefold derivation, viz., from the pra>J torian edict, from the civil law, and from the Imperial constitutions. Maine, Anc. Law, 207. Jns triplex est,-proprietatis, posses* sionis, et possibiUtatis. Right More...

In Roman law. A name applied to the Roman law of wills,o in the time of Justinian, on account of Its' threefold derivation, viz., from the pra>J torian edict, from the civil law, and from the Imperial constitutions. Maine, Anc. Law, 207. Jns triplex est,-proprietatis, posses* sionis, et possibiUtatis. Right is threefold,-of property, of possession, and of possibility. Less...

In Roman., law. A right or privilege allowed to the parent of three or more children. 2 Kent4 Comm. 85; 2 BL Comm. 247. These privi-' leges were an exemption from the trouble of. guardianship, priority in bearing offices, and *o a treble proportion of corn. Adams, Rom.; Ant. (Am. More...

In Roman., law. A right or privilege allowed to the parent of three or more children. 2 Kent4 Comm. 85; 2 BL Comm. 247. These privi-' leges were an exemption from the trouble of. guardianship, priority in bearing offices, and *o a treble proportion of corn. Adams, Rom.; Ant. (Am. Ed.) 227.. Less...

The right to use property without destroying its substance. It is employed in contradistinction to the jus abutendi. 3 Toullier, no. 86.

The right to use property without destroying its substance. It is employed in contradistinction to the jus abutendi. 3 Toullier, no. 86. Less...

The right of hunting and fishing. Jns vendit quod usns approbavit. El- lesm. Postn. 85. The law dispenses what use. has approved.

The right of hunting and fishing. Jns vendit quod usns approbavit. El- lesm. Postn. 85. The law dispenses what use. has approved. Less...

Lat. An oatb. J us jurandum inter alios factum nee noeere nee prodesse debet. An oath made between others ought neither to hurt nor profit. 4 Inst. 279.

Lat. An oatb. J us jurandum inter alios factum nee noeere nee prodesse debet. An oath made between others ought neither to hurt nor profit. 4 Inst. 279. Less...

Right; in accordance with law and justice. "The words 'just' and 'justly* do not always mean 'just' and 'justly* in a moral sense, but they not unfrequently, in their connection with other words in a sentence, bear a very different signification. It is evident, however, that the word 'lust' in More...

Right; in accordance with law and justice. "The words 'just' and 'justly* do not always mean 'just' and 'justly* in a moral sense, but they not unfrequently, in their connection with other words in a sentence, bear a very different signification. It is evident, however, that the word 'lust' in the statute [requiring an affidavit for an attachment to state that plaintiff's claim is just] means 'just' in a moral sense; and from its isolation, being made a separate subdivision of the section, it is intend-, ed to mean 'morally just' in the most emphatic terms. The claim must be morally just, as well as legally just, in order to entitle a party to an attachment." Robinson v. Burton, 5 Kan. * 300. . -Just cause. Legitimate cause; legal or lawful ground for action; such reasons as will suffice in law to justify the action taken. State v. Baker, 112 La. 801. 36 South. 703; Claiborne v. Railroad Co., 46 W. Va. 371, 33 S. E. 265.-Just compensation. As used in the constitutional provision that private property shall not be taken for public use without "just compensation," this phrase means a full and fair equivalent for the loss sustained by the taking for public use. It may be more or it may be less than the mere money value of the property actually taken. The exercise of tbe power being necessary for the public good, and all property being held subject to its exercise when and as the public good requires it it would be unjust to the public that it should be required to pay the owner more than a fair indemnity for the loss he sustains by the appropriation of his property for the general good. On the other hand, it would be equally unjust to the owner if he should receive less than a fair indemnity for such loss. To arrive at this fair indemnity, the interests of the public and of the owner, and all the circumstances of the particular appropriation, should be taken into consideration. Lewis. Em. Dom. ? 462. And see Butler Hard Rubber Co. v. Newark, 61 N. J. Law, 32, 40 Atl. 224: Trinity College v. Hartford, 32 Conn. 452; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed. 270; Putnam v. Douglas County, 6 Or. 332, 25 Am. Rep. 527; Laflin v. Railroad Co. (C. C.) 33 Fed. 417; Newman v. Metropolitan El. R. Co., 118 N. Y. 623, 23 N. E. 901, 7 L. R. A. 289; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312> 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L. Ed. 463; Railway Co. v. Stickney, 150 111. 362, 37 N. Bl 1098, 26 L. R. A. 773; Chase v. Portland, 86 Me. 367, 29 Atl. 1104; Spring Valley Waterworks v. Drinkhouae, 92 Cal. 536, 28 Pac. 683.-Just debts. As used in a will or a statute, this term means legal, valid, and incontestable obligations, not including such as are barred by the statute of limitations or voidable at the election of the party. See Burke v. Jones, 2 Ves. & B. 275; Martin v. Gage, 9 N. Y. 401: Peck v. Botsford, 7 Conn. 176. 18 Am. Dec. 92; Collamore v. Wilder, 19 Kan. 82; Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 63, 6 Am. Dec. 28; People v. Tax Com'rs, 99 N. Y. 154, 1 N. E. 401.-Just title. By the term "just title," in cases of prescription, we do not understand that which the possessor may have derived from the true owner, for then no true prescription would be necessary, but a title which the possessor may have received from any person whom he honestly believed to be the real owner, provided the title were such as to transfer the ownership of the property. Civ. Code La. art. 3484; Davis v. Gaines, 104 U. S. 400. 26 L. Ed. 757: Sunol v. Hepburn, 1 Cal. 254Kennedy v. Townslev. 16 Ala. 248.- Just value. In taxation, the fair, honest, and reasonable value of property, without exaggeration or depreciation: its actual market value. State v. Smith, 158 Ind. 543, 63 N. E. 214, 63 L. R. A. 116; Winnipiseogee Lake, etc, Co. v. Gilford, 67 N. H. 514, 35 Atl. 945. Less...

In old English law. A certain measure of liquor, being as much as was sufficient to drink at once. Mon. Angl. t 1* c. 149.

In old English law. A certain measure of liquor, being as much as was sufficient to drink at once. Mon. Angl. t 1* c. 149. Less...

In the civil law. A just cause; a lawful ground; a legal transaction of some kind. Mackeld. Rom. Law, " 283.

In the civil law. A just cause; a lawful ground; a legal transaction of some kind. Mackeld. Rom. Law, " 283. Less...

v. In old English practice. To do justice; to see justice done; to summon one to do justice.

v. In old English practice. To do justice; to see justice done; to summon one to do justice. Less...

n. In jurisprudence. The constant and perpetual disposition to render every man his due. Inst. 1, 1, pr.; 2 Inst 56. See Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 528, 44 Am. Dec. 217; Duncan v. Magette, 25 Tex. 253; The John E. Mulford (D. C.) 18 Fed. 455. The conformity of More...

n. In jurisprudence. The constant and perpetual disposition to render every man his due. Inst. 1, 1, pr.; 2 Inst 56. See Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 528, 44 Am. Dec. 217; Duncan v. Magette, 25 Tex. 253; The John E. Mulford (D. C.) 18 Fed. 455. The conformity of our actions and our will to the law. Toull. Droit Civil Fr. tit prel. no. 5. In the most extensive sense of the word it differs little from "virtue;" for it includes within itself the- whole circle of virtues. Yet the common distinction between them is that that which, considered positively and in itself, is called "virtue," when considered relatively and with respect to others has the name of "justice." But "justice " being in itself a part of "virtue," is confined to things simply good or evii, and consists in a man's taking such a proportion of them as he ought. Bouvier. Commutative justice is that which should govern contracts. It consists in rendering to every man the exact measure of his dues, without regard to his personal worth or merits, i. c, placing all men on an equality. Distributive justice is that which should govern the distribution of rewards and punishments. It assigns to each the rewards which his personal merit or services deserve, or the proper punishment for his crimes. It does not consider all men as equally deserving or equally blameworthy, but discriminates between them, observing a just proportion and comparison. This distinction originated with Aristotle. (Eth. Nic. V.) See Fonbl. Eq. 3; Toull. Droit Civil Fr. tit. prel. no. 7. In Norman French. Amenable to justice. Kelham. In feudal law. Jurisdiction; judicial cognizance of causes or offenses. High justice was the jurisdiction or right of trying crimes of every kind, even the highest This was a privilege claimed and exercised by the great lords or barons of the middle ages. 1 Robertson's Car. V., appendix, note 23. Low justice was jurisdiction of petty offenses. In common law. The title given in England to the judges of the king's bench and the common pleas, and in America to the judges of the supreme court of the United States and of the appellate courts of many of the states. It is said that this word in its Latin form (justitia) was properly applicable only to the judges of common-law courts, while the tenn "judex" designated the judges of ecclesiastical and other courts. See Leg. Hen. I. H 24, 63; Co. Litt. 71b. The same title is also applied to some of the judicial officers of the lowest rank and jurisdiction, such as police justices and justices of the peace. -Justice ayres, (or aires.) In Scotch law. Circuits made by the judges of the justiciary courts through the country, for the distribution of justice. Bell.-Justice in eyre. From the old French word "circ," i. e., a journey. Those justices who in ancient times were sent by commission into various counties, to hear more especially such causes as were termed "pleas of the crown," were called "justices in eyre. They differed from justices in oyer and terminer. Inasmuch as the latter were sent to one place, and for the purpose of trying only a limited number of special causes; whereas the justices in eyre were sent through the various counties, with a more indefinite and general commission. In some respects they resembled our present justices of assise, although their authority and manner of proceeding differed much from them. Brown.-Justice seat. In English law. The principal court of the forest held before the chief justice In eyre, or chief itinerant judge, or his deputy; to hear and determine all trespasses within the forest and all claims of franchises, liberties, and privileges, and all pleas and causes whatsoever therein arising. 3 Bl. Comm. 72: 4 Inst. 291; 3 Steph. Comm. 440.-Justices of appeal. The title given to the ordinary judges of the English court of appeal. The flrst of such ordinary judges are the two former lords justices of appeal in chancery, and one other judge appointed by the crown by letters patent. Jud. Act 187o. i 4.-Justices of assise. These justices, or, as they are sometimes called, "justices of ntst prius," are judges of the superior English courts, who go on circuit into the various counties of England and Wales for the purpose of disposing of such causes as are ready for trial at the assizes. See ASSIZE.-Justices of gaol delivery. Those justices who are sent with a commission to hear and determine all causes appertaining to persons, who, for any offense, have been cast into gaol. Part of their authority was to punish those who let to mainprise those prisoners who were not bailable by law, and they seem formerly to have been sent into the country upon this exclusive occasion, but afterwards had the same authority given them as the justices of assize. Brown.-Justices of laborers. In old English law. Justices appointed to redress the fro-wardness of laboring men, who would either be idle or have unreasonable wages. Blount.- Justices of nisi prius. In English law. This title is now usually coupled with that of justices of assize; the judges of the superior courts acting on their circuits in both these capacities. 3 Bl. Comm. 58. 59.-Justices of oyer and terminer. Certain persons appointed by the king's commission, among whom were usually two judges of the courts at Westminster, and who went twice in every year to every county of the kingdom, (except London and Middlesex,) and, at what was usually called the "assizes," heard and determined all treasons, felonies, and misdemeanors. Brown. -Justices of tbe bench. The justices of the court of common bench or common pleas.-Justices of tbe forest. In old English law. Officers who had jurisdiction over all offenses committed within the forest against vert or venison. The court wherein these justices sat and determined such causes was called the "justice seat of the forest." They were also sometimes called tbe "justices in evre of the forest" Brown.-Justices of tbe hundred. Hun-dredors: lords of the hundreds: they who had the jurisdiction of hundreds and.held the hundred courts.-Justices of tbe Jews. Justices appointed by Richard I. to carry into effect the laws and orders which he bad made for regulating the money contracts of the Jews. Brown. -Justices of tbe pavilion. In old English law. Judges of a uyepowder court, of a most transcendant jurisdiction, anciently authorized by the bishop of Winchester, at a fair held on St. Giles' hills near that city. Cowell; Blount. -Justices of tbe quorum. See QUORUM. " Justices of trail-baston* In old English" law. A kind of justices appointed by King Edward I. upon occasion of great disorders in the realm; during bis absence in the Scotch and French wars. They were a kind of justices in eyre, with great powers adapted to the emergency, and which they exercised in a summary manner. Cowell; Blount. Less...